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INTRODUCTION
This Court is being asked again to take up important issues about the interplay
of tort and copyright law to control the flow of information on the internet. When
the Court wrestled with similar issues in Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2003), it recognized their “significant precedential and public policy
importance” given the ubiquity of the internet. Based on Kremen, which recognized
a claim for conversion of a domain name, the District Court held that a website
owner can use state trespass law to control how visitors see its web pages, without
running afoul of copyright preemption or the First Amendment. These new duties
recognized by the District Court’s order are implicated every time a user accesses a
website. Early appellate guidance thus is essential not only to this case and these
parties, but to anyone who uses the internet.
The underlying case concerns one of the countless ways a person can search
for and access websites on the internet—specifically, the Google Search App on
Android (“Search App”). The Search App, with its integration into Android phones,
provides Android users with a convenient option to quickly search the internet. The
Search App gives the user an option to view a separate frame recommending “related
pages” that Google believes might be of interest.
Plaintiffs complain that Google’s recommendations might suggest a site
Plaintiffs do not endorse, might lead users to material critical of Plaintiffs, or may

1
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contain advertisements for competing sites.

Nothing about the Search App,

however, affects how Plaintiffs’ websites function or how they are displayed by
other programs, and nothing interferes with Plaintiffs’ computer systems or even the
files stored on them.

Plaintiffs simply think they are entitled to control the

surrounding screen environment when users of Google’s Search App display
Plaintiffs’ websites on their own phones. Plaintiffs want to prohibit users from
seeing the suggested alternatives that the Search App superimposes in a “pop-up”
frame on their screens when they visit Plaintiffs’ sites.
The ability to control the display of any copy of a website by the owner of that
website is the quintessential domain of federal copyright law, but Plaintiffs tellingly
do not assert a copyright claim. Plaintiffs instead bring state law claims for trespass
to chattels, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition.
None of these is remotely viable. The trespass to chattels claim fails as a
matter of law because Google’s Search App does not interfere with or harm
Plaintiffs’ tangible property in any manner. Use of the Search App, at most, affects
“copies” of websites, which Plaintiffs can control only to the extent federal copyright
law allows. The unjust enrichment claim is likewise squarely preempted by the
Copyright Act. What remains of the unfair competition claim is entirely derivative
of the non-viable trespass and unjust enrichment claims: it fails.

2
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And even if Plaintiffs could plead valid state law claims, the First Amendment
protects Google’s right to suggest results to users and users’ rights to decide what
information they wish to see and how they wish to see it. Plaintiffs’ claim that
Google cannot suggest “related pages” to users who visit a website in an expandable
“pop up” frame directly threatens these First Amendment interests. Those interests
are no less important even if Plaintiffs’ allegation that some of the suggested pages
may contain advertisements is assumed to be true.
After more than 10 months’ consideration and grappling with these claims in
a 21-page order, the District Court allowed them to proceed past the pleading stage.
A1-21 (the “Order”). The District Court, however, certified four critical questions
for interlocutory review. A22-27. These questions concern (1) whether this Court’s
precedent should be extended to protect as chattel the copies of websites displayed
on a user’s screen; (2) whether trespass to chattels can be based on “functional harm
or disruption” to a website; (3) whether website owners can invoke state law to
control how their websites are displayed on a user’s screen without preemption by
federal copyright law; and (4) whether the risk of confusing or misleading consumers
defeats Google’s First Amendment right to suggest search results to users interested
in viewing a particular website. A24.
This case satisfies all three of Section 1292(b)’s requirements. A22-27. All
four certified questions are “controlling questions of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

3
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They are all “legal questions that do not depend on a material dispute of fact” and
are “potentially dispositive” of some or all of Plaintiffs’ claims. A24.
Nor is there any doubt that the certified questions present “substantial ground
for difference of opinion.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As the District Court recognized,
the certified questions are “novel and difficult.” A24. In many instances, they are
“questions of first impression” that “no court” has before considered. A24-25. And
for the rest, “[o]ther courts” disagree with the District Court on the answers. A25.
What’s more, the District Court’s resolution of these questions sparked immediate
critical commentary from leading academics, who recognized that Plaintiffs’
theories risk disrupting how people access the internet.
Finally, an immediate appeal would “materially advance . . . the litigation.”
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A ruling in Google’s favor on any question could dispose of
one or all of Plaintiffs’ claims, narrowing or terminating the case. A27. “[E]ven an
affirmance” would materially advance the litigation by clarifying the scope of
Plaintiffs’ claims, help focus “potentially wide-ranging and expensive discovery into
how millions of websites may have been displayed on Android devices over a twoyear period,” and inform thorny questions likely to arise during any class
certification proceedings. A27. Indeed, because Plaintiffs bring claims on behalf of
a sprawling putative class, early appellate guidance on the viability or scope of
Plaintiffs’ legal theories would conserve substantial judicial and party resources.

4
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Even apart from the statutory factors, this case presents an exceptional case
for immediate appellate review. Given “ubiquity and importance of the Internet,”
there are “serious public policy considerations” involved with “imposing new tort
duties” of the sort Plaintiffs envision. Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1040. Indeed, expanding
these causes of action would chill the availability and development of tools for
making information more accessible on the internet.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.

The Complaint And Google’s Motion To Dismiss.

Users can access the internet, and through it, Plaintiffs’ websites, using a
number of different “browser” programs, such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox,
and Microsoft Edge. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 3, 34. Mobile device users can also access websites
through individual applications installed on their devices, such as Google’s Search
App. Id. ¶¶ 59-60. If the user inputs a query into the Search App, it returns a list of
results. Id. ¶¶ 60, 69. When a user clicks one of the suggested results, the Search
App retrieves, loads, and displays a copy of the webpage. Id. ¶ 70.
Plaintiffs’ claims target a Search App function where, if the user chooses, the
Search App will display links to other websites that Google believes the user might
find relevant based on the current page the user is viewing in the Search App
(“Related Pages”). When enabled, these links appear in a separate frame which
temporarily appears on the user’s screen and covers a portion of the copy of

5
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Plaintiffs’ website being displayed on the user’s screen. See id. ¶¶ 73-74. The frame
is subject to the user’s control; it initially appears closed and expands only after the
user affirmatively clicks the “pop-up button.” See id. ¶ 74. The stages of this Related
Pages

functionality

are

illustrated

by

images

in

the

complaint:

Id. ¶¶ 73-74. Plaintiffs allege that this Related Pages functionality “obscures” and
“blocks” their websites. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that the related links may be “ads
for the host website’s competitors” or “links to news stories about the website’s
owner.” Id. ¶¶ 77-78.
Plaintiffs Best Carpet Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action suit against Google, asserting claims for
trespass to chattels, implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment, and unfair and
unlawful conduct in violation of California Business and Professions Code
6
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§§ 17200, 17203. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs purport to represent all website owners
residing in the United States that own active websites between March 2018 and April
2020 on which Google’s “Related Pages” banner appeared when their websites were
viewed by Android mobile phone users using the Search App. Id. ¶ 156. As the
owners of active U.S.-based websites, Plaintiffs claim an entitlement “to control the
content and information displayed on their websites’ web pages, including any
advertisements, without interference.” Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiffs believe that by interfering
with the display of their websites, Google committed trespass to chattels, and to the
extent that Google superimposed advertisements over their websites without consent
or payment, Google is liable under a theory of implied-in-law contract or unjust
enrichment. See id. ¶¶ 176-190.
Google moved to dismiss the complaint. Dkt. No. 19. Google argued the
trespass to chattels claim failed because Google’s Search App did not physically
injure any of Plaintiffs’ tangible property. The unjust enrichment claim, Google
contended, was preempted by the Copyright Act because it sounded in the “display”
right protected by 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). And to the extent the UCL claim was not
entirely derivative of the trespass and unjust enrichment claims, it failed to allege an
incipient violation of the antitrust laws as required by Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v.
L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 187 (1999). Google also argued that
Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the First Amendment because they sought to

7
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control the display of the information that Google chooses to suggest and that users
choose to see when they access Plaintiffs’ websites.
B.

The District Court’s Motion To Dismiss Order.

After extensive briefing and oral argument, the District Court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ “unfair” conduct claim under California Business and Professions Code
§ 17200, but otherwise permitted Plaintiffs to proceed. A1-21.
Trespass to Chattels.

Trespass to chattels lies where an intentional

interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury.
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350-51 (2003). Plaintiffs’ claim presented
at least two questions, including whether copies of websites displayed on a user’s
screen are protectable chattel and whether a user-controlled overlay is a cognizable
interference with the chattel. A7-13. The District Court answered both questions in
the affirmative. Extending the reasoning of Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th
Cir. 2003), which recognized under California law a claim for conversion of a
domain name, the District Court reasoned that Plaintiffs “have property rights to
their websites for the same reasons a registrant has property rights to a domain
name.” A8-9. And citing Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003), the District
Court held that “functional harm or disruption” in the form of obscuring copies of
Plaintiffs’ websites sufficed to state a claim even without any allegation of “physical
harm to their websites.” A12. In reaching these conclusions, the District Court

8
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distinguished Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210 (2010), and the
California Court of Appeal’s post-Kremen warning that “the expansion of
conversion law to reach intangible property should not be permitted.” A10 & n.6.
The District Court acknowledged seven contrary decisions, but declined to follow
them. A11 & n.7. The District Court also overlooked Hamidi’s holding that trespass
to chattels should not encompass a claim where the conduct “neither damages the
recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning.” 30 Cal. 4th at 1347.
Implied-In-Law Contract/Unjust Enrichment.

The District Court next

analyzed whether the Copyright Act preempts Plaintiffs’ claims. A13-18. 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 preempts state-law claims where (1) the work involved falls within the general
subject matter of the Copyright Act; and (2) the rights that the plaintiff asserts under
state law are equivalent to an exclusive right protected by 17 U.S.C. § 106. Kodadek
v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). The District Court
found that Plaintiffs’ websites fall within the subject matter of copyright, but that
their claim did not involve rights equivalent to an exclusive right protected by the
Copyright Act. A14-18.
The District Court reasoned that Plaintiffs want and expect Google to copy
and display their websites and did not allege that Google “improperly benefited”
from using their websites, as a copyright infringement plaintiff might. A15-16.
Rather, the District Court found that the claims stem from “the coercive act of

9
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superimposing advertisements” on Plaintiffs’ websites and from their right to
prevent the display of their websites from being “covered up or obscured” even for
a moment. A16.
Section 17200. The District Court permitted a claim for unlawful conduct
using the trespass to chattels and implied contract/unjust enrichment claims as
predicates. A18. The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for unfair conduct
because Plaintiffs could not show an incipient antitrust violation. A18-A19.
First Amendment. The District Court recognized Google’s First Amendment
right to provide search engine results as part of its right to speak. A20. It questioned,
however, Google’s right to speak again, after a user selects a website to visit, with
additional suggestions specific to the selected website. A20. It also recognized that
Plaintiffs were not challenging the content of Google’s search engine results, but
Google’s right to display them in this way whether they advertised competitor
websites or critical news stories. A5; A20. Because Plaintiffs allege that this second
round of search results includes deceptive advertising, Google’s First Amendment
right to display alternative search suggestions could be discounted. A20. The
District Court also found that any right users may have to receive these websitespecific suggestions was irrelevant because Google could not assert its users “right
to hear.” A21.

10
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C.

The District Court’s Order Certifying An Interlocutory Appeal.

Google sought certification of the District Court’s order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) and a stay of proceedings pending appeal. Dkt. 44. On May 2, 2022, the
District Court granted those requests, certifying four controlling questions of law
and staying proceedings pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit. A22-27.
QUESTIONS WARRANTING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
The District Court certified four controlling questions of law (A24):
(1)

Whether Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003), should be extended
to protect as chattel the copies of websites displayed on a user’s screen?

(2)

Whether trespass to chattels can be based on “functional harm or disruption”
to a website even though there is no “physical harm to their websites”?

(3)

Whether website owners can invoke state law to control how their websites
are displayed on a user’s screen without preemption by federal copyright law?

(4)

Whether the risk consumers may be confused or misled by deceptive
advertising defeats Google’s First Amendment right to suggest search results
to users interested in viewing a particular website?
RELIEF SOUGHT
Google respectfully requests that this Court grant its petition for permission

to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and reverse the District Court’s
determination that Plaintiffs stated claims for breach of an implied-in-law contract
and unjust enrichment, trespass to chattels, and unlawful conduct in violation of
California Business and Professions Code § 17200.

11
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ARGUMENT
Certification of a non-final order for interlocutory appeal is appropriate where
(1) the order involves a “controlling question of law,” (2) there is “substantial ground
for difference of opinion,” and (3) an immediate appeal “may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see Reese v. BP
Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking interlocutory
appeal from order on motion to dismiss). Here, the District Court found that all three
requirements are clearly satisfied. The District Court’s determination warrants
“careful consideration” (United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.
1959)) and should be affirmed.
I.

The Order Involves Four Controlling Questions Of Law.
The four questions certified by the District Court are controlling questions of

law. See A23-24. They are questions of law that arise from Google’s motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). A24. They are controlling because resolving them
could “materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court” by disposing
of some or all claims. In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.2d 1020,
1026 (9th Cir. 1982). The first two questions are “potentially dispositive” of
Plaintiffs’ trespass-to-chattels claim and one of their unlawful conduct theories
under Section 17200. A24. The third question not only concerns the implied

12
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contract/unjust enrichment claim, but potentially disposes of all the claims. And the
fourth question “is potentially dispositive of all of the claims.” A24.
II.

There Is Substantial Ground For Difference Of Opinion.
The certified questions also satisfy the second statutory factor because “there

is substantial ground for difference of opinion” regarding the District Court’s
resolution of them. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “[A] substantial ground for difference of
opinion exists . . . where reasonable jurists might disagree on an issue’s resolution.”
Reese, 643 F.3d at 688. That is indisputably the case here. A24-26.
First, the fundamental issues underlying the certified questions have been
jurisprudentially controversial since their inception.

When this Court first

considered Kremen, it certified the issues to the California Supreme Court because
there were “reasonable arguments . . . on both sides.” Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d
1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court was forced to render a decision when the
California Supreme Court declined the certification, only to have the California
Court of Appeal later take issue with it in Silvaco. Silvaco observed that conversion
traditionally required a taking of tangible property and cautioned that “the expansion
of conversion law to reach intangible property should not be permitted to ‘displace
other, more suitable law.’” 184 Cal. App. 4th at 239 n.21. It should be no surprise
that any extension of Kremen or application of similar theories would be equally
difficult, divisive, and fraught.

13
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Second, while not required, there is on-point contrary authority on all four
questions, as set forth below.
Extension of Kremen. Applying California state law, this Court held in
Kremen that the tort of conversion applies to domain names. But since Kremen,
other courts have disagreed over “whether the related tort of trespass to chattels
extends to other forms of intangible property.” A25 (collecting cases). Indeed, other
courts have parted ways with the District Court and refused to apply trespass-tochattels theories to intangibles like websites.

See Discovery Educ., Inc. v.

SchoolsPLP, LLC, 2021 WL 2292223, at *3 (D. Del. June 4, 2021) (Bibas, C.J.)
(declining to recognize websites as chattel, noting that only “[a] few state courts
have [done] so”); Exeter Twp. v. Gardecki, 2018 WL 6616930, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
17, 2018) (“electronic files” are not chattel); UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Li, 2018 WL
2555429, at 4 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2018) (Davila, J.) (“computer files” cannot be the
subject of conversion or related torts); MedioStream, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 1095, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Silvaco, finding “documents and data
and computer data discs” were not subject to conversion); Tethys Bioscience, Inc. v.
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 2010 WL 2287474, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. June 4, 2010) (citing Silvaco, refusing to extend Kremen to a patent application);
GNI Waterman LLC v. A/M Valve Co., 2007 WL 2669503, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
7, 2007) (dismissing trespass to chattels claim that was based on intangible

14
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ownership rights of forms, designs, and patterns). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claims are even
further out of step with the case law, because the alleged chattel is not even websites
or computer files on servers under Plaintiffs’ control, but rather “the copies of
Plaintiffs’ websites appearing on users’ screens.” A7 (emphasis added).
Functional But No Physical Harm. Similarly, in cases involving intangibles
like websites, courts have disagreed over whether physical harm is required to state
a claim. A25; see also hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 2022 WL
1132814 at *16 n.21 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting a split over whether web scraping
constitutes trespass to chattels); Discovery Educ., Inc., 2021 WL 2292223, at *3
(finding no trespass to chattels when there is no claim defendant’s actions “damaged
the actual website (by slowing it down, for example)”); Fields v. Wise Media, LLC,
2013 WL 5340490, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2013) (noting judicial split over
“whether physical damage to the computer or device is necessary”).
Copyright Preemption. Whether website owners can invoke state law to
control how their websites are displayed on a user’s screen without preemption by
federal copyright law presents “a novel and difficult issue.” A26. “[N]o court has
considered whether copyright preemption applies to a claim” like Plaintiffs’, “based
on allegations that defendant superimposed advertisements on a website homepage
and other landing pages without the consent of or compensation to the website
owner.” A26. And there is good reason to think other courts might disagree with
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the District Court here based on other decisions involving the scope of the display
right in federal copyright law. See Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir.
2007) (the exclusive rights of the Copyright Act protects are implicated when images
are “shrank, expanded, distorted, overlaid and otherwise edited”); Gilliam v. ABC,
538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976) (“unauthorized editing of the underlying work”
infringes); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 543 (W.D.
Tex. 1980) (“addition of advertisements” to the work constitutes copyright
infringement).
First Amendment. The First Amendment rights to speak and hear “similarly
raise[] a novel and difficult issue.” A26. Many courts have recognized that the First
Amendment protects search engine output results. A26. “[N]o court has considered
whether that protection extends to advertisements and other messages superimposed
on a website homepage and other landing pages.” A26. There is substantial ground
to think that other jurists might disagree with the District Court’s order on this point,
given that other courts have found similar speech to be protected by the First
Amendment. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) (expression
that combines fully protected “expression and commercial promotion” requires
“more protection” than ordinary commercial speech); Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2012) (heightened scrutiny applied to yellow
pages even though they contained advertisements); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
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ComicMix LLC, 983 F.3d 443, 461 (9th Cir. 2020) (the right to speak outweighs
concerns about confusion or deception under trademark law, except when the use of
the trademark is explicitly misleading); Järlström v. Aldridge, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1205,
1219 n.9 (D. Or. 2018) (states may not absolutely prohibit potentially misleading
information “if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive”).
In sum, this is not a situation where reasonable judges might differ. This is
one where reasonable judges have already differed. The decisions cited above are
just illustrative examples.
Third, the Order sparked quick and critical academic commentary. Almost
immediately, Stanford Law Professor Mark Lemley tweeted “[t]he nutty Internet
‘trespass to chattels’ theory is back . . . [a]nd this time it’s worse.”
https://twitter.com/marklemley/status/1442872861140520967 (“Just wait until the
court finds out about the ‘resize windows’ button.”).
A more extensive analysis was then published by Santa Clara Law Professor
Eric Goldman in his post “If ‘Trespass to Chattels’ Isn’t Limited to “Chattels,”
Anarchy Ensues–Best Carpet Values v. Google,” Technology & Marketing Law
Blog (Oct. 19, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/10/if-trespass-tochattels-isnt-limited-to-chattels-anarchy-ensues-best-carpet-values-v-google.htm.
Professor Goldman explained how embracing Plaintiffs’ claimed interest in “a
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‘canonical’ version of a web page” is displayed “strips users of their own agency to
decide what browsing tools best serve their needs and how best to configure those
tools.” Id. He identified the uncertain core of the Plaintiffs’ claims since they do
not own user screens and insist they are not relying on their copyright interest in
their websites. Id. He questioned the extension of Kremen as “very, very confused”
and inconsistent with Hamidi’s requirement that interference “cause measurable loss
to computer system resources.” Id. He argues that the “extra element” to avoid
preemption is “exactly what the derivative work rights covers” under the Copyright
Act. Id. As for the First Amendment analysis, he said, “I can’t bring myself to blog
it.” Id. He warned that the Order “creates a distorted pastiche of the precedent to
reach an obviously wrong and wholly counterintuitive outcome” that will create
“plenty of problematic edge cases.” Id.
Reasonable minds clearly disagree about the resolution of these issues.
III.

An Immediate Appeal Would Materially Advance Resolution Of This
Case.
Section 1292(b) does not require “that the interlocutory appeal have a final,

dispositive effect on the litigation, only that it ‘may materially advance’ the
litigation.” Reese, 643 F.3d at 688. Resolution of a question “materially advances”
the termination of a litigation when, as here, it “shorten[s] the time” spent on the
lawsuit, or reduces the “effort, or expense of conducting the lawsuit.” In re Cement
Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1027.
18
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Guidance now will materially advance the litigation. “If the Ninth Circuit
rules in favor of [Google] on even one question, then one or more of Plaintiffs’
claims will be dismissed.” A26. That “would impact the scope of Plaintiffs’ case
and potentially their ability to pursue claims on behalf of a putative class.” A26.
“[E]ven an affirmance” would materially advance the litigation by clarifying
the scope of Plaintiffs’ claims. A27. Identifying what the precise issues are and will
need to be the focus of discovery is sensible case management before “potentially
wide-ranging and expensive discovery into how millions of websites may have been
displayed on Android devices over a two-year period.” A27. Given the amount-incontroversy and the size of the putative class, “the cost of discovery in this case will
impose a heavy burden on the parties and the Court,” and early Ninth Circuit review
“could result in a significant reduction of that burden or even eliminate it altogether.”
Silbersher v. Allergan Inc., 2021 WL 292244, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2021).
Immediate appellate review is particularly helpful here because Plaintiffs
bring these claims on behalf of a putative class. To decide whether it is appropriate
to certify a class of “tens of millions” of website owners, we need to know whether
it matters if the suggested search result was an advertisement or a news story,
whether it is necessary to determine what parts of the original website may have
been blocked, whether a website owner needs to establish harm, whether there has
to be a finding of deception or confusion, whether there needs to be demonstrable
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detrimental reliance, whether any overlay or superimposition is per se illegal or does
it depend on what Google suggests or the degree of functional harm. “[E]specially
in class actions, uncertainty over a key claim’s status ‘may delay settlement (almost
all class actions are settled . . .), and by doing so further protract the [case].’” Casas
v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, 2015 WL 13446989, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015).
Needless to say, the questions identified so far will not be the only difficult
ones. Any insight that can be gleaned from how the Ninth Circuit views these issues
will prove invaluable to the efficient and correct adjudication of this matter.
IV.

This Is An Exceptional Case Warranting Immediate Review.
This case is the kind of exceptional case that warrants interlocutory review.

These issues are of immense significance to anyone who uses or conducts business
on the internet. When the Ninth Circuit considered whether to extend the tort of
conversion to domain names in Kremen, the Court declared the issue to be of
“significant precedential and public policy importance” given the “ubiquity and
importance of the Internet” and the “serious public policy considerations” involved
with “imposing new tort duties.” Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1040.
Indeed, the issues presented in this case affect not just the parties, but also the
public at large. The novel extension of trespass to chattels to websites threatens to
upend activities long understood to be lawful and vital to the public’s access to
information. The mere threat of liability may chill the development and availability
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of tools the public uses to access the internet. A leading scholar reviewing the Order
identified several “problematic edge cases” implicated by Plaintiffs’ theories. See
Goldman, supra. Under the Order’s logic, things like browser updates that change
how websites are displayed or functionality that allows users to resize browser
windows might be trespass to chattels because they might obscure or block parts of
websites. Id. Functionality that makes websites more accessible, by increasing the
size of text to make it more visible or changing the display color to ease eye strain,
might lead to tort liability too.
Even looking merely at the parties’ interests, these issues are unusually
significant. In this case alone, Plaintiffs seek a monetary recovery in excess of “$2
billion.” Dkt. 1, ¶ 146. Plaintiffs also seek extraordinary relief in the form of “a
permanent injunction requiring Google to forever disable the ad-generating feature
of its Search App on every Android phone on which it has been installed, and
preventing Google from installing any similar ad-generating code on any internet
related devices or products in the future.” Id., ¶¶ 182, 190. Interlocutory review here
would serve Section 1292(b)’s core purpose of “avoid[ing] protracted and expensive
litigation.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.
CONCLUSION
This case raises difficult and important issues. When the Ninth Circuit first
wrestled with Kremen v. Cohen, it recognized its “significant precedential and public
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policy importance” given the ubiquity of the internet. 325 F.3d at 1040. The same
is true with Kremen’s extension. Plaintiffs’ theories are implicated every time a user
visits a website because the Order recognizes the website owner’s right to control
how it is displayed. The claims are not limited to instances of deceptive advertising,
they apply broadly—every time a user opens multiple overlapping windows that
may block the one displaying the website, every program that may display a website
in a smaller window size than intended, and every ADA accommodation tool used
to alter how a website functions to assist the visually or hearing impaired. It is
important that these legal questions are answered definitively, correctly, and
promptly.
Immediate appellate guidance has importance beyond this case and these
parties. The requirements for interlocutory review and its wisdom in this instance
are clearly present. Google respectfully requests that the Court grant Google’s
petition for permission to appeal.
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1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

SAN JOSE DIVISION

7
BEST CARPET VALUES, INC., et al.,

8

Case No. 5:20-cv-04700-EJD

Plaintiffs,
9

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART MOTION TO
DISMISS

v.
10
GOOGLE LLC,

11

Re: Dkt. No. 19

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendant.
12
Plaintiffs Best Carpet Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

13
14

initiated this putative class action suit, asserting claims against Defendant Google LLC (“Google”)

15

for implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment; trespass to chattels; and unfair and unlawful

16

conduct in violation of California Business and Profession Code § 17200. Pursuant to Rule

17

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Google moves to dismiss the complaint without

18

leave to amend. Dkt. No. 19. Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Dkt. No. 22) and Google filed a reply

19

(Dkt. No. 28). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part

20

Google’s motion.

21

I.

BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs are owners of active U.S.-based websites. Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff Best Carpet

22
23

Values, Inc. (“Best Carpet”) owns bestcarpetvalue.com and Plaintiff Thomas D. Rutledge

24

(“Rutledge”) owns thomasrutledgelaw.com. Id. ¶ 9. A website is a digital document built with

25

software and housed on a computer called a “web server.” Id. ¶ 34. A webserver is owned or

26
27
28

1

The Background is a summary of the allegations in the Complaint.
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1

controlled in part by the website’s owner. Id. Commercial websites typically have a unique

2

“domain name” or “URL” (Uniform Resource Locator) address which enables an internet user to

3

find the webserver on which the website resides. Id. ¶ 35. All websites have at least one page,

4

called a homepage. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs allege that “[b]y rights of ownership—and under the First

5

Amendment—website owners are entitled to control the content and information displayed on

6

their websites’ web pages, including any advertisements, without interference.” Id. ¶ 51. Once a

7

website is “published” and becomes “active,” Internet users can reach a website by entering the

8

website’s domain name into an internet “browser” program such as Google Chrome, Mozilla

9

Firefox or Microsoft Edge. Id. ¶ 37.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Internet users do not necessarily need a URL to reach a website. Internet users can find the

11

website by entering “search terms” into the “search bar” of an internet search engine such as

12

Google.com, Yahoo.com or Bing.com. Id. ¶ 38. Performing searches on search engines yields

13

“search results” typically in the form of a list of websites or documents that are potentially

14

responsive to the user’s search terms. Id. When the internet user clicks on a link to a website, the

15

user’s internet browser will connect the user to, and upload a page from, the website. Id. “The

16

browser does this by finding and connecting to the web server hosting the website. The browser

17

then obtains a copy of the requested website page from the host web server and delivers the copy

18

to the user by translating the website’s codes and recreating the website page on the user’s

19

computer monitor or mobile device screen.” Id. ¶ 39.

20

Google operates several internet related businesses that provide a variety of internet related

21

products and services. Id. ¶ 54. Among other things, Google (1) makes and controls Android

22

mobile phone software, including the Android operating system, which allows users to wirelessly

23

access the internet; (2) owns and operates the world’s most used internet browser, Google

24

Chrome, and the world’s most-used internet search engine, google.com; and (3) owns the world’s

25

largest internet advertising network, offering products serving every aspect of that industry,

26

including Google Ads (for clients advertising on Google’s search results pages), AdSense

27

(matching buyers and sellers of display advertising on websites), and AdX (for buyers and sellers

28
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1
2

Android phone users can search the internet by either (1) opening a browser, such as

3

Chrome, by clicking the Chrome icon on one of their Android home screens; or (2) using Google’s

4

Search App, which is incorporated into nearly every Android phone. Id. ¶¶ 59-60. Android users

5

searching the internet are able to retrieve virtually the same search results, whether they use

6

Search App or Chrome. Id. ¶¶ 63-64.

7

United States District Court
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of premium, high-end website display ads). Id. ¶¶ 55-58.

Before March of 2018, the Search App icon “

” appeared in the suite of Google apps

8

that Google installs on Android phones, and many Android users had to click on the Search App

9

icon to use the App. Id. ¶ 62. In late March of 2018, Google updated its Search App software by

10

placing the Search App’s search bar at the top of the first page of most Android home screens. Id.

11

¶¶ 65, 66. This software update eliminated the need for Android users to click an icon before

12

conducting an internet search using Google’s Search App. Id. ¶ 60. The Search App search bar

13

bears Google’s “

14

Period”), virtually all of the approximately 50 million Android phone users in America have used

15

the Search App’s search bar to search the internet. Id. ¶ 68.

16

” logo. Id. ¶ 67. Between March of 2018 and April of 2020 (the “Class

When Android users input internet search terms in the Search App’s search bar, the Search

17

App provides the user with search results, which appear on the Android user’s screen as a list of

18

websites and other documents available on the internet. Id. ¶ 69. The names of the websites on

19

this search results list contain hyperlinks to those websites. Id. ¶ 70. When users click on a

20

website name, Google’s search result page disappears from their screen and is replaced by the

21

website’s homepage. Id.

22

During the Class Period, “most websites retrieved via Search App, when activated by an

23

Android user’s touching and toggling of their phone’s screen, had Google’s unlawful ads

24

superimposed on their homepages or other ‘landing’ pages.’” Id. ¶ 64. More specifically, Google

25

superimposed a leaderboard ad at the bottom of homepages that consisted of Google’s logo, the

26

phrase “VIEW 15 RELATED PAGES,” and a pop-up button. Id. ¶¶ 73-74. To illustrate, when a

27

Search App user clicked Best Carpet’s homepage link from the search results list, the website

28
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1

appeared as depicted in the image below on the left. Id. ¶ 73.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. ¶ 73. Once a user engaged Best Carpet’s website by toggling its homepage, however, Google’s

17

Search App activated and superimposed Google’s leaderboard ad on top of Best Carpet’s website

18

as depicted above in the image to the right. Id. The result was that Google’s leaderboard, “VIEW

19

15 RELATED PAGES,” covered Best Carpet’s invitation to users to view its “Cove Base”

20

products. Id. If a user were to click on the pop-up button (encircled triangle) in the leaderboard,

21

the Search App superimposed two half-page “banner” ads that blocked 80% of what was

22

previously viewable, and shadowed the remaining 20%. Id. ¶ 74. The two half-page banner ads

23

were for Best Carpet’s direct competitors. Id. ¶ 74, 79. Technically, the superimposed “banner”

24

ads appeared on the copy of Best Carpet’s website that was reproduced on the user’s screen. Id. ¶

25

75. Best Carpet considers that copy its property. Id. Each banner ad contained a link that, if

26

clicked, redirected the users from Best Carpet’s homepage to its competitor’s web page. Id. ¶¶ 76,

27

79-80. The image below illustrates the superimposed “banner” ads.

28
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2
3
4
5
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11
12
13
14
15
16

Google’s ads intruded on website owners’ limited space and created distractions that undermined

17

every web page’s central purpose. Id. ¶ 88. They also “compelled” business owners in nearly

18

every conceivable industry to advertise for others, including competitors. Id. ¶¶ 89, 91. Google’s

19

ad could also be misperceived by Android users as endorsements of unaffiliated businesses and

20

people. Id. ¶ 91. The Related Pages banner ads often included ads for the host website’s

21

competitors (id. ¶ 77) and links to news stories about the host website’s owner, including negative

22

news articles (id. ¶¶ 78, 85).

23

The purpose of the March 2018 software update was to generate profit and Google

24

succeeded in doing so. Id. ¶¶ 100-148. Google updated its Search App on or about April 22, 2020

25

to discontinue (at least temporarily) the conduct alleged in the Complaint. Id. ¶ 8, n.1. Plaintiffs

26

estimate that for those two years, Google obtained over $2 billion of non-consensual free

27

advertising. Id. ¶ 146.

28
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1

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient

2

United States District Court
Northern District of California

STANDARDS

3

specificity “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

4

it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).

5

A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may, therefore, be dismissed if it fails to

6

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

7

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient

8

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

9

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial

10

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

11

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. In evaluating the complaint,

12

the court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Id. at 664. The

13

court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Retail

14

Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (the

15

court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” for a Rule

16

12(b)(6) motion). The court, however, “does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations in a

17

complaint or legal claims asserted in the form of factual allegations.” In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836

18

F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555-56). Dismissal “is

19

proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to

20

support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

21

III.

Plaintiffs assert three claims on behalf of themselves, a Class, a Georgia Subclass, and a

22
23

DISCUSSION

California Subclass.2 Each claim is addressed separately below.

24
25
26
27
28

The “Class” is: “All persons or entities residing in the United States that owned websites that
were active between March 2018 and April 2020 (the ‘Class Period’) on which Google’s logo and
Related Pages banner ads appeared when their websites were viewed by Android mobile phone
owners using the Search App.” Compl. ¶ 156.
2

The “Georgia Subclass” is: “All persons or entities residing in Georgia that owned websites that
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1

A.

Trespass to Chattels Claim

2

Trespass to chattels lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal

3

property has caused injury. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1350-51 (2003); see also

4

Brodsky v. Apple Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148808, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2019). “Dubbed

5

by Prosser the ‘little brother of conversion,’ the tort of trespass to chattels allows recovery for

6

interferences with possession of personal property ‘not sufficiently important to be classed as

7

conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing with which he has

8

interfered.’” Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1350 (quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 14,

9

pp. 85–86). Under California law, “[i]n cases of interference with possession of personal property

10

not amounting to conversion, ‘the owner has a cause of action for trespass or case [sic], and may

11

recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of

12

its use.’” In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting

13

Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th at 1351).

14

Here, there are two potential chattels: the computers hosting Plaintiffs’ websites and the

15

copies of Plaintiffs’ websites appearing on users’ screens. Google contends the trespass to chattels

16

claim fails as a matter of law as to both potential types of chattel because its Search App does not

17

cause physical injury (i.e., intrusion, interference or harm) to any tangible property. Mot. at 6. In

18

making this argument, Google implicitly acknowledges that the computers hosting Plaintiffs’

19

websites are tangible property, but contends that the Search App does not interact with those

20

computers, much less damage them. As for the copies of Plaintiffs’ websites appearing on users’

21

screens, Google contends that they are not tangible property, and therefore cannot be the subject of

22

a trespass claim.

23
24
25
26
27
28

were active between March 2018 and April 2020 on which Google’s logo and Related Pages
banner ads appeared when their websites were viewed by Android mobile phone owners using the
Search App.” Id. ¶ 157.
The “California Subclass” is: “All persons or entities residing in California that owned websites
that were active between March 2018 and April 2020 on which Google’s logo and Related Pages
banner ads appeared when their websites were viewed by Android mobile phone owners using the
Search App.” Id. ¶ 158.
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In response, Plaintiffs contend that tangible and intangible property alike can be the subject

1
2

of a trespass to chattels claim, and that they are alleging an injury to their intangible property,

3

namely their websites.3 Google allegedly injured their websites because the superimposed ads

4

impaired the website’s “condition, quality, or value.” Opp’n at 18.
Consistent with Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029-31, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2003), and

United States District Court
Northern District of California

5
6

subsequently issued cases, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a website can be the subject of a

7

trespass to chattels claim. In Kremen, the Ninth Circuit held that a registrant has property rights in

8

a domain name, and further that a domain name is intangible property4 that is protected by

9

California conversion law. Id. at 1035. In doing so, the Kremen court recognized that conversion

10

was originally a remedy for the wrongful taking of another’s goods, so it applied only to tangible

11

property. Id. at 1030. The Kremen court, however, observed that virtually every jurisdiction has

12

discarded this limitation to some degree and cited to the Restatement as one example of an

13

alternative test:

14

(1) Where there is conversion of a document in which intangible
rights are merged, the damages include the value of such rights.

15

(2) One who effectively prevents the exercise of intangible rights of
the kind customarily merged in a document is subject to a liability
similar to that for conversion, even though the document is not itself
converted.

16
17
18

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 242 (1965) (emphasis added). The Kremen court surveyed

19

California cases, determined that California does not follow the Restatement’s merger requirement

20

quoted above,5 and opined that conversion is a remedy for conversion of “every species of

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

None of Plaintiffs’ websites, files, or data were physically altered in any way. Nor were
Plaintiffs’ servers disrupted.
3

4

A property right exists in a domain name because (1) it is an interest capable of precise
definition; (2) it is capable of exclusive possession or control; and (3) registrants of the domain
name have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Id. at 1030.
The Kremen court observed that “courts routinely apply the tort to intangibles without inquiring
whether they are merged in a document and, while it’s often possible to dream up some document
the intangible is connected to in some fashion, it’s seldom one that represents the owner’s property
interest.” Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1033.
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1

personal property,” whether tangible or intangible. Id. at 1033 (quoting Payne v. Elliot 54 Cal.

2

339, 341 (1880)). Nevertheless, the Kremen court found it unnecessary to resolve whether or not

3

California applies the merger requirement because Kremen’s domain name had a “connection to a

4

document or tangible object,” namely the Domain Name System (“DNS”)—the distributed

5

electronic database that associates domain names with particular computers connected to the

6

internet. Id. at 1033-34. The DNS was, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, akin to an electronic

7

document. Id. at 1034. The Ninth Circuit explained:

8

We need not delve too far into the mechanics of the Internet to resolve
this case. It is sufficient to observe that information correlating
Kremen’s domain name with a particular computer on the Internet
must exist somewhere in some form in the DNS; if it did not, the
database would not serve its intended purpose. Change the
information in the DNS, and you change the website people see when
they type “www.sex.com.”

9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

Id. at 1034. After Kremen, several courts have held that domain names are subject to conversion

13

in California. See e.g., CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010)

14

(“Domain names are thus subject to conversion under California law, notwithstanding the

15

common law tort law distinction between tangible and intangible property for conversion

16

claims.”); United States Marine Surveyors, Inc. v. Reiner, 2016 WL 9131961, at *4 (C.D. Cal.

17

Aug. 4, 2016) (“A website domain is property which may be converted.”); Salonclick LLC v.

18

SuperEgo Mgmt. LLC, 2017 WL 239379, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) (holding that plaintiff

19

had stated a claim for conversion of domain name and social media accounts under New York

20

law).

21

Plaintiffs have property rights to their websites for the same reasons a registrant has

22

property rights to a domain name. The owner of an Internet website “has the right to establish the

23

extent to (and the conditions under) which members of the public will be allowed access to

24

information, services and/or applications which are available on the website.” U.S. v. Drew, 259

25

F.R.D. 449, 461 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing U.S. v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219–21 (5th Cir. 2007);

26

EF Cultural Travel BV v.Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2003); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio,

27

Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); and CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,

28
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1

Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023–24 (S.D. Ohio 1997)). Plaintiffs contend that website ownership

2

grants them a right to be paid for the advertising space occupied by Google on their websites. And

3

like a domain name, a website is a form of intangible property that has a connection to an

4

electronic document. “A website is a digital document built with software and housed on a

5

computer called a ‘web server,’ which is owned or controlled in part by the website’s owner. A

6

website occupies physical space on the web server, which can host many other documents as

7

well.” Compl. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs’ website is also connected to the DNS through its domain name,

8

bestcarpetvalue.com, just as Kremen’s domain name was connected to the DNS. Under the

9

Kremen court’s reasoning, Plaintiffs’ website has a connection to a tangible object, which satisfies

10

the Restatement’s merger requirement.6 Therefore, consistent with Kremen, trespass to chattels

11

ought to apply to a website, and several courts have so found. See YLD Ltd. v. Node Firm, 2016

12

WL 7851414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (applying New York and federal law and denying

13

motion to dismiss claims for trespass to chattels and conversion that were based, in part, on an

14

alleged disruption to the use of a website); Combs v. Doe, 2011 WL 738052, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb.

15

23, 2011) (magistrate’s report and recommendation granting default judgment on conversion claim

16

based on allegations that defendant stole website and domain names by hacking into plaintiff’s

17

email); Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 609, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

18

(sustaining claim for conversion of copyrighted website); Ground Zero Museum Workshop v.

19

Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678, 698 (D. Md. 2011) (finding allegations that defendant deprived

20

plaintiff of possession of website and damaged the chattel by inserting a redirect command

21

support a legally cognizable trespass to chattels claim); State Analysis, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Servs.

22

Assoc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 (E.D. Va. 2009) (sustaining trespass to chattels claim where

23
24
25
26
27
28

6

After Kremen, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, noted that conversion
traditionally required a taking of tangible property and that “this restriction has been greatly
eroded,” but not “destroyed.” Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 239 n.21
(2010) (emphasis in original). The Silvaco court also cautioned that “the expansion of conversion law
to reach intangible property should not be permitted to ‘displace other, more suitable law.’” Id. As
discussed above, however, Plaintiffs’ websites have a connection to a tangible object.
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1

defendant accessed a password protect portion of plaintiff’s website and thereby diminished the

2

value of plaintiff’s “possessory interest in its computer network”). Google points to only one case

3

in the Ninth Circuit where the court rejected a claim for trespass to chattels involving intangible

4

property. See e.g., GNI Waterman LLC v. A/M Valve Co. LLC, 2007 WL 2669503, at *11 (E.D.

5

Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (dismissing trespass to chattels claim that was based on intangible ownership

6

rights of forms, designs and patterns). The Waterman case, however, is not helpful because it

7

lacks any analysis.7

8

Having concluded that a website is a form of intangible property subject to the tort of

9

trespass to chattels, the next issue is whether Plaintiffs have alleged an injury. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th

10

at 1348 (“the trespass to chattels tort . . . may not, in California, be proved without evidence of an

11

injury to the plaintiff’s personal property or legal interest therein”). “In modern American law

12

generally, ‘[t]respass remains as an occasional remedy for minor interferences, resulting in some

13

damage, but not sufficiently serious or sufficiently important to amount to the greater tort’ of

14

conversion.” Id. at 1351 (quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts, supra, § 15, p. 90, italics added.).

15

“Therefore, one who intentionally intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if

16

his intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

7

In Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., 713 F. Supp. 2d 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the
court held that the claim for trespass to chattels under Illinois and New York law failed because
(1) defendant never assumed “physical control” over plaintiff’s story idea and characters and (2)
the claim was preempted by federal copyright law. Other cases cited by Google do not discuss the
distinction between tangible and intangible property and offer little guidance. See e.g., Level 3
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Lidco Imperial Valley, Inc., 2012 WL 4848929, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012)
(explaining that trespass to chattels requires “intentionally bringing about a physical contact with
the chattel”); In re L.T., 103 Cal. App. 4th 262, 265 (2002) (explaining that for arson, “chattels”
are things that are “visible, tangible, movable”); Italiani v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 45 Cal.
App. 2d 464, 467 (1941) (explaining that trover, detinue and replevin require “interference with
possession of, or damage to, some specific tangible property, and are not concerned with
intangible or incorporeal rights which may exist in connection with, or entirely apart from any
particular piece of physical property”); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040,
1069 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing trespass claim because although placement of data on Iphones
may have caused “harm” by taking up bandwidth, storage space, or shortening the battery life of a
device, plaintiffs did not plausibly establish a significant reduction in service constituting an
“interference with the intended functioning of the system, as by significantly reducing its available
memory and processing power”) (citation omitted); Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park, 220 Cal.
App. 4th 495, 508 (2013) (conversion claim asserted against an employee who retained plaintiff’s
documents was not displaced by California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
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1

condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel

2

for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest of the possessor is affected.” Id.;

3

see also Grace v. Apple, Inc., 2019 WL 3944988, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2019) (same). In

4

Hamidi, Intel filed suit again a former employee, claiming that by communicating with employees

5

over the company’s e-mail system, Hamidi committed trespass to chattels. Id. at 1346-47. The

6

California Supreme Court concluded that Intel was not entitled to summary judgment on its

7

trespass to chattels claim because Intel had not presented undisputed facts demonstrating that the

8

emails caused any “physical or functional harm or disruption” to the company’s computer system.

9

Id. at 1360 (emphasis added).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Here, although Plaintiffs are not alleging physical harm to their websites, they do allege

11

functional harm or disruption. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “[b]y obscuring and blocking the

12

contents of [Plaintiffs’] website homepages when viewed on Android’s Search App, Google’s ads

13

substantially interfered with and impaired the websites’ published output and exposed the website

14

owners to unwanted risks of lost advertising revenues and lost sales to competitors, thereby

15

materially reducing the websites’ value and utility to the website owners. Defendant’s

16

unauthorized interferences proximately caused Plaintiffs . . . actual damage by impairing the

17

condition, quality and value of their websites.” Id. ¶ 186. Plaintiffs seek damages equal to the

18

diminished market value of their websites and a permanent injunction requiring Google to disable

19

the ad-generating feature of its Search App on every Android phone on which it is installed and

20

preventing Google from installing any similar feature in the future. Id. ¶¶ 187-90.

21

Google argues that there is no cognizable injury because its Search App does not affect

22

how Plaintiffs’ websites function or how they are displayed by other programs. Mot. at 2. Google

23

explains that its Search App does not alter Plaintiffs’ websites at all, but rather “displays

24

additional content in a separate, user-controlled frame that overlays and coexists on phone screens

25

with Plaintiffs’ sites.” Mot. at 7 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 73-74). But at the pleading stage, Plaintiffs’

26

factual allegations must be taken as true. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs allege that the ads

27

obscured and blocked their websites, which if true, would interfere with and impair their websites’

28
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1

published output. Google’s ad allegedly obscured the “Cove Base” product link on Best Carpet’s

2

home page. Compl. ¶ 73. Although Google’s ad may not have disabled or deactivated the “Cove

3

Base” product link, it nevertheless allegedly impaired the functionality of the website: an Android

4

phone user cannot engage a link that cannot be seen. At the pleading stage, the alleged decrease in

5

functionality of Plaintiffs’ website is sufficient to plausibly state a cognizable injury for a trespass

6

to chattels claim. See Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1026 (S.D. Ohio

7

1997) (plaintiff asserting injury aside from physical impact on computer equipment stated

8

cognizable trespass to chattels claim based on decreased utility of plaintiff’s e-mail service and

9

resulting customer complaints); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070

10

(N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting injunction based on likelihood of success on merits of trespass to

11

chattels claim based, in part, on showing that web crawlers diminished the quality or value of

12

eBay’s computer system, even though eBay did not claim physical damage).

13

B.

Implied Contract/Unjust Enrichment Claim

14

Plaintiffs also assert a claim labeled “Implied Contract/Unjust Enrichment.” Compl. ¶¶

15

176-182. Google contends that the Implied Contract/Unjust Enrichment claim should be

16

dismissed because it is preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act. Google reasons that

17

Plaintiffs’ demand to be paid inevitably depends on their ability to control how copies of their

18

websites are displayed on different users’ devices, and any right to control the way the websites

19

appear must be grounded in the principles of copyright law.

20

Copyright preemption applies to claims that are “asserted to prevent nothing more than the

21

reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of” the plaintiff’s copyrightable property.

22

Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citation and internal

23

quotation marks omitted). Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts a state law claim when two

24

conditions are satisfied: (1) the work involved falls within the general subject matter of the

25

Copyright Act as specified by sections 102 and 103; and (2) the rights that the plaintiff asserts

26

under state law are equivalent to those protected by the Act in section 106 in works of authorship

27

that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d

28
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1

1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the first condition is satisfied because websites and the manner

2

in which they are displayed fall within the subject matter of copyright. See Ticketmaster LLC v.

3

Prestige Entm’t W., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1160-61 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“the typical

4

commercial website readily qualifies for copyright protection.”); Bangkok Broad. & TV Co. v.

5

IPTV Corp., 742 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (copyright protects website owners’

6

“exclusive rights to copy, distribute or display the copyrighted work publicly”).

7

Plaintiffs rely on Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001),

8

which sets forth a slightly different formulation of the test for preemption. Plaintiffs argue that

9

Google’s ads (and not the websites) are the subject matter of their claim, and because they do not

10

assert any copyright in Google’s ads, their claim is not preempted. In Downey, the Ninth Circuit

11

stated that the two conditions that must be satisfied for copyright preemption are: (1) “the content

12

of the protected right must fall within the subject matter of copyright” and (2) “the right asserted

13

under state law must be equivalent to the exclusive rights contained in section 106 of the

14

Copyright Act.” Id. The plaintiffs in Downing brought suit against defendant because it published

15

a photograph of them without their authorization. The Ninth Circuit held that the first condition

16

was not satisfied because “the subject matter of [plaintiffs’] statutory and common law right of

17

publicity claims [was] their names and likenesses,” which were not copyrightable, even though

18

their names and likeness were embodied in a copyrightable photograph. Id. at 1005. Here, the

19

“subject matter” of Plaintiffs’ claim necessarily concerns both Plaintiffs’ websites and the

20

advertisements. Plaintiffs allege that it is the placement of the ads “on top” of their websites that

21

give rise to their right to damages. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 73. As stated previously, websites fall within

22

the subject matter of copyright. Therefore, the first part of the preemption test is satisfied.

23

Turning to the second condition, the Second Circuit has instructed that section 301

24

preemption “only applies to those state law rights that ‘may be abridged by an act which, in and of

25

itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights’ provided by federal copyright law.’” Comput.

26

Assocs. Int’l, Inc v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Harper & Row,

27

Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471

28
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1

U.S. 539 (1985)). In other words, copyright preemption applies to claims that are “asserted to

2

prevent nothing more than the reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of” a plaintiff’s

3

copyrightable property. Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004)

4

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the state law claim requires an extra element

5

“instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution or display . . . ,

6

then the right does not lie ‘within the general scope of copyright’ and there is no preemption.”

7

Nat’l Car Rental Sys. v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting 1

8

Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B], at 1-13)). To avoid preemption, the state law claim must include

9

“an ‘extra element’ that makes the right asserted qualitatively different from those protected under

10

the Copyright Act” and “must effectively change the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively

11

different from a copyright infringement claim.” Media.net Advert.FZ-LLC v. NetSeer, Inc., 156 F.

12

Supp. 3d 1052, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (state law claims predicated on alleged copying of

13

“source code, design and look and feel” of search results page were preempted).
Here, Plaintiffs are not asserting infringement of any right to the reproduction,

14
15

performance, distribution, or display of their websites.8 Plaintiffs want and expect Google to copy

16

and display their websites in Chrome browser and Search App, and acknowledge that Google has

17

license to do so. Opp’n at 6. Rather, Plaintiffs’ implied-in-law contract/unjust enrichment claim

18

is a state claim with extra elements “instead of or in addition to” the acts giving rise to a copyright

19

infringement claim. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 431. An implied-in-law contract claim “is

20

a common law obligation implied by law based on the equities of a particular case.” Fed. Deposit

21

Ins. Corp. v. Dintino, 167 Cal. App. 4th 333, 346-47 (2008); see also Parino v. Bidrack, Inc., 838

22

F. Supp. 2d 900, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“a claim for unjust enrichment/restitution is properly pled

23

as a claim for a contract implied-in-law”). A party may be required to make restitution under an

24
25
26
27
28

8

As such, this case is distinguishable from the cases cited by Google in which the plaintiff
asserted claims of copyright infringement. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d
467, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D.
Mich. 2003); and U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 724 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(rejecting copyright infringement claim, but dismissing unjust enrichment claim without prejudice).
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1

implied-in-law contract if that party is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Id. at 346.

2

“Unjust enrichment claims are not categorically preempted by the Copyright Act.” Martin v. Walt

3

Disney Internet Grp., 2010 WL 2634695, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
Plaintiffs allege that Google “unjustly enriched itself by saving substantial advertising

United States District Court
Northern District of California

4
5

costs and earning undue profits at Plaintiffs’ expense . . ., and it did so through the coercive act of

6

superimposing advertisements on their websites’ homepages and other landing pages without

7

obtaining their consent or paying them compensation.” Compl. ¶ 178. Plaintiffs allege that this

8

unjust enrichment “gives rise to an implied-in-law obligation and contract with Plaintiffs . . .

9

requiring Defendant (i) to restore them to their original positions by making restitution to them

10

equal to the full value of the cost savings benefits that Defendant unjustly obtained, and (ii) to

11

disgorge and pay to them Defendant’s undue profits gained from its ads.” Id. Plaintiffs do not

12

rely on copyright protection for their websites in pleading their claim; Plaintiffs do not allege that

13

Google “improperly benefited from using a certain work.” Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F.

14

Supp. 2d 1115, 1123-24 (N.D. Cal. 2001).9 Instead, Google allegedly covered up or obscured a

15

portion of Plaintiffs’ websites from Android phone users for financial benefit, which makes their

16

claim “qualitatively different” from a copyright claim.
Indeed, the content of Plaintiffs’ websites and whether that content enjoys copyright

17
18

protection are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs analogize their claim to that of a store

19

owner, asserting:

20

Google could not in the brick-and-mortar marketplace lawfully plant
its logo on Plaintiffs’ storefront windows without Plaintiffs’ consent,
even if Google owned their buildings. Nor could Google place ads in

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

9

As such, this suit is distinguishable from cases relied on by Google. See Identity Arts v. Best
Buy Enter. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 1149155, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (preemption applied
to unjust enrichment claim that was based on wrongful creation and use of derivative works of a
movie trailer); Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enter., 2013 WL360542, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29,
2013) (preemption applied to implied contract claim that was based on unauthorized use of
copyrighted structural steel detailing software); Santos v. Telmundo Commc’ns Grp. LLC, 2012
WL 9503003, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (unjust enrichment claim based on same facts and
same rights as copyright claim, i.e. alleged broadcasting of songs without permission, was
preempted).
Case No.: 5:20-cv-04700-EJD
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
16

A16

Case:
22-80042, 05/12/2022,
ID: 12445797,
DktEntry:
1-2, Page 17
50 of 21
64
Case 5:20-cv-04700-EJD
Document
41 Filed
09/24/21

Plaintiffs’ marketing brochures or superimpose ads on top of
Plaintiffs’ print advertisements without Plaintiffs’ permission and
without paying Plaintiffs’ price. Likewise, Google cannot in the
online marketplace unilaterally superimpose ads on Plaintiffs’
website without Plaintiffs’ consent and without compensation just
because Google makes the software through which Android users
view that website on their mobile screens.

1
2
3
4
5

Compl. ¶ 17. According to Plaintiffs, a storefront business owner is injured when its window is

6

obscured, regardless of whether that window is clear or covered with advertisements. By analogy,

7

a website owner is injured when its website is obscured by unwanted ads, regardless of the content

8

displayed in the website.
From Google’s perspective, the subject matter of Plaintiffs’ websites is surely significant.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9
10

The leaderboard pop-up button Google superimposed on the Best Carpet website homepage led to

11

ads for alternative products of potential interest to the Android phone user: “Commercial Carpet

12

Tiles” and “Commercial Carpet Tiles & Resilient Flooring.” Compl. ¶ 74. Google no doubt

13

placed carpet ads on Best Carpet’s website to lure business and make profit. But from Plaintiffs’

14

perspective, the content of their websites is not germane to their claims. What matters for

15

purposes of Plaintiffs’ claim is that their websites are potential revenue-generating advertising

16

space, and not that they display copyrightable content.
Under Plaintiffs’ theory, a Google ad obscuring a website with trivial or no content at all

17
18

could support a claim for implied contract/unjust enrichment. Hypothetically, a website could

19

consist of nothing more than a single line of noncopyrightable text such as “Pat and Jo’s

20

Wedding.”10 If this hypothetical noncopyrightable website was overlaid with ads for wedding

21

attire and tableware, an argument could be made that the advertiser was unjustly enriched at the

22

expense of the wedding planners. “California law recognizes a right to disgorgement of profits

23

resulting from unjust enrichment, even where an individual has not suffered a corresponding loss.”

24

In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 599 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs’ claim

25
26
27
28

Copyrights extend to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,” such as literary, musical, graphic, architectural works and sound recordings. 17
U.S.C. § 102(a).
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1

to recover advertising fees is not preempted. See In re De Laurentiis Entm’t Grp., Inc., 963 F.2d

2

1269, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1992) (copyright preemption not implicated as defense against implied-in-

3

law contract claim to recover “the reasonable value of the advertising [plaintiff] had provided for

4

[defendant’s] benefit and for which it had not been paid”).

5

C.

Section 17200 Claim

6

Plaintiffs allege the Android Search App violates Section 17200 of California’s Unfair

7

Competition Law (“UCL”), which prohibits business practices that are “unlawful, unfair, or

8

fraudulent.” Cal. Bus & Prof Code § 17200. Plaintiffs bring their claim under only the first two

9

prongs: unlawful and unfair. Compl. ¶ 194. As to the unlawful business practices prong,

10

Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant plac[ed] nonconsensual advertisements on Plaintiffs’ . . . websites

11

without compensation in violation of the common law doctrines of implied-in-law contract and

12

unjust enrichment, and by trespassing on Plaintiffs’ . . . websites in violation of the common law

13

prohibition against trespass to chattels.” Compl. ¶ 195. As to the unfair business practices prong,

14

Plaintiffs allege that Google’s conduct is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous,

15

unconscionable and substantially injurious to Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 196. Plaintiffs also allege that

16

Google’s conduct is contrary to public policy as well as the common law, and the harm it caused

17

(and threatens to continue to cause) outweighs its utility, if any. Id.

18
19

1.

Unlawful Prong

The unlawful prong of the UCL prohibits “anything that can properly be called a business

20

practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular

21

Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (1999) (quotation markets and citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ UCL

22

claim, as pled under the unlawful prong, survives because the trespass to chattels and the breach of

23

implied contract/unjust enrichment may serve as the predicate for the claim.

24
25

2.

Unfair Prong

There are two standards for determining what “unfair competition” is under the UCL, and

26

the parties disagree on the applicable standard. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim is

27

essentially one “between competitors,” and therefore the applicable standard is whether the

28
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1

conduct complained of threatens “an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy

2

or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the

3

law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 187.

4

Plaintiffs rely on the second standard, which is applicable to claims brought by a consumer and

5

“involves balancing the harm to the consumer against the utility of the defendant’s practice.”

6

Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs characterize

7

themselves as “consumers of Google’s services giving the public access to their websites (which

8

they did not have to pay for because the service is free).” Opp’n at 19.

9

Google has the better argument. Plaintiffs are not consumers of the product that has

10

caused the alleged injury, the Google Search App.11 In the context of this case, the consumers are

11

Android phone users who search the Internet for content. Therefore, the Cel-Tech standard

12

applies. Because Plaintiffs effectively concede they cannot meet the Cel-Tech standard, the UCL

13

claim, as pled under the unfair prong, is dismissed.

14

D.

First Amendment Defense

15

Finally, Google argues that the First Amendment prohibits Plaintiffs’ attempts to control

16

what information is displayed to users when they access Plaintiffs’ websites. Mot. at 12. In

17

response, Plaintiffs contend that their First Amendment rights as website publishers are paramount

18

and that Google has no right to force its own messages onto Plaintiffs’ websites.
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment

19
20

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

21

press.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “[T]he First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term

22

necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n

23

of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988). The Free Speech Clause of the First

24

Amendment “can serve as a defense in state tort suits.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451

25
26
27
28

California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act defines a consumer as “an individual who seeks or
acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.”
Cal. Civ. Code § 1761; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1791 (“consumer goods” are products “used,
bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”).
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1

(2011) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988)). In the context of the

2

Internet, courts have recognized that search-engine results may constitute speech protected by the

3

First Amendment. See E-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d, 1265, 1274

4

(2016) (search engine output results are protected by the First Amendment); Zhang v. Baidu.Com,

5

Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“When search engines select and arrange others’

6

materials, and add the all-important ordering that causes some materials to be displayed first and

7

others last, they are engaging in fully protected First Amendment expression.”); Search King, Inc.

8

v. Google Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (Google’s PageRank

9

system was “entitled to full constitutional protection”). Thus, a company such as Google cannot

10

be compelled to place ads in “prominent places” on its search engine results. Langdon v. Google,

11

Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (D. Del. 2007) (“Defendants are correct in their position that the

12

injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff contravenes Defendants’ First Amendment rights.”).

13

Here, Plaintiffs are not challenging Google’s search engine results. Rather, Plaintiffs

14

complain that after users see Google’s search results and then choose to link to their proprietary

15

websites, the users see unpaid-for Google ads on their webpages that entice and redirect those

16

users to Best Carpet’s competitors’ or naysayers’ websites in order to generate profits for Google.

17

Compl. ¶¶ 71-88. Therefore, the cases cited above are inapposite.

18

Furthermore, the First Amendment defense is not absolute. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001.

19

For example, the First Amendment does not immunize deceptive advertising. Id. at 1002 (holding

20

that defendant’s commercial use of photographs to promote clothing “does not contribute

21

significantly to a matter of the public interest and that Abercrombie cannot avail itself of the First

22

Amendment”). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Google’s leaderboard and banner ads are commercial

23

speech that misleadingly imply that they endorse Google’s ads or were compensated by Google

24

for placing the ads. Compl. ¶¶ 75, 85. Therefore, if Plaintiffs prevail in this suit, Google can be

25

enjoined from tethering similar ads to Plaintiffs’ websites in the future. See Zauderer v. Office of

26

Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626, 637-38 (1985) (advertising is a form of

27

commercial speech and can be enjoined if false, deceptive or misleading); Compuserve Inc. v.

28
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1

Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1026 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that the First Amendment

2

provides no defense for intentional bulk emailing to plaintiff’s subscribers).
Relatedly, Google argues that Android users’ have a “right to hear”—the right to receive

3
4

information—that is “no less protected by the First Amendment than [Google’s] right to speak.

5

Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, this right is “a necessary

6

predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political

7

freedom.” Bd. of Educ., Island Tress Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).

8

Here, it is the Android users who are the recipients of the advertising, not Google. The “right to

9

hear” does not provide Google a defense against Plaintiffs’ claims.12

10

IV.

For the reasons stated above, Google’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the UCL

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

12

claim under the unfair prong and DENIED in all other respects. The UCL claim under the unfair

13

prong is dismissed without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

14
15

Dated: September 24, 2021
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

12

The other cases relied upon by Google are inapplicable here. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) (holding that First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making private
possession of obscene material a crime); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010)
(federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications
violated First Amendment).
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1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

SAN JOSE DIVISION

7
BEST CARPET VALUES, INC., ET AL.,

8

Plaintiffs,

9
v.

10

GOOGLE LLC,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

Defendant.

12

Case No. 5:20-cv-04700-EJD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND
STAYING ACTION PENDING APPEAL
Re: Dkt. No. 44

Defendant Google LLC (“Defendant”) asks the Court to certify for interlocutory appeal the

13
14

September 24, 2021 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 41)

15

and to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. Dkt. No. 44. Plaintiffs Best Carpet

16

Values, Inc. and Thomas D. Rutledge (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition (Dkt. No. 46),

17

and Defendant filed a reply (Dkt. No. 47). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition

18

without oral argument. See Civil Local 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will

19

grant Defendant’s motion.

20

I.

21

BACKGROUND
As website owners, Plaintiffs allege they are entitled “to control the content and

22

information displayed on their websites’ web pages, including any advertisements, without

23

interference.” Compl. ¶ 51, Dkt. No.1. Between March 2018 and April 2020, Defendant

24

allegedly superimposed ads on their websites without their consent. Id. ¶ 53. In this putative class

25

action suit, Plaintiffs assert claims for implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment; trespass to

26

chattels; and unfair and unlawful conduct in violation of California Business and Professions Code

27
28
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1

§ 17200. Id. ¶¶ 176-98.

2

Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

3

12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 19. On September 24, 2021, the Court issued its ruling (“Order”). Dkt. No.

4

41. First, relying on Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court concluded that

5

Plaintiffs’ websites are a form of intangible property that may be the subject of a trespass to

6

chattels claim. Dkt. No. 41 at 9. The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs stated a cognizable

7

claim based on alleged “functional harm or disruption” to their websites, even though there was no

8

“physical harm to their websites.” Id. at 12. Second, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument

9

that the Copyright Act preempted the implied contract/unjust enrichment claim. Third, the Court

10

concluded that Plaintiffs stated a cognizable section 17200 claim using the trespass to chattels and

11

implied contract/unjust enrichment claims as predicates. Lastly, the Court rejected Defendant’s

12

First Amendment defense. Defendant now seeks certification to appeal the Court’s Order pursuant

13

to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

14

II.

15

DISCUSSION
In general, “only final judgments” of the district courts are appealable. James v. Price

16

Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). Title 28 United States Code § 1292(b)

17

codifies a narrow exception to that “normal rule.” Id. at 1067 n.6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

18

1292(b), a district judge may certify for immediate appeal an otherwise nonappealable order in a

19

civil action if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

20

difference of opinion and . . . an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the

21

ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Certification is appropriate “when

22

novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded jurists might reach contradictory

23

conclusions.” Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011). The

24

conditions for interlocutory appeal of the Order are met in this case.

25

A.

26

Controlling questions of law are those whose resolution “materially affect the outcome of

27
28

Controlling Questions of Law
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1

litigation in the district court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026

2

(9th Cir. 1982). Here, although Plaintiffs argue to the contrary, Defendant has identified four

3

controlling questions of law:

4

(1) Whether Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003), should
be extended to protect as chattel the copies of websites displayed on
a user’s screen;

5

(2) Whether trespass to chattels can be based on “functional harm or
disruption” to a website even though there is no “physical harm to
their websites”;

6
7
8

(3) Whether website owners can invoke state law to control how their
websites are displayed on a user’s screen without preemption by
federal copyright law; and

9
10

(4) Whether the risk consumers may be confused or misled by
deceptive advertising defeats Google’s First Amendment right to
suggest search results to users interested in viewing a particular
website.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13

Mot. at 2. These are legal questions that do not depend on a material dispute of fact. The first two

14

issues are potentially dispositive of the trespass to chattels claim and one of the unlawful conduct

15

theories underpinning the section 17200 claim. Defendant raised the third question, preemption,

16

as a basis to dismiss the implied-in-law contract/unjust enrichment claim. The fourth question

17

concerning Google’s right to speak is potentially dispositive of all of the claims. The Court thus

18

finds that the first requirement for § 1292(b) is satisfied.

19

B.

20

Second, there must be “substantial grounds” for a difference of opinion. CTSI Oregon,

Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion

21

Inc. v. Int’l Longshore and Warehouse Union, 22 F.4th 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2022). “Courts

22

traditionally will find that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where ‘. . . novel

23

and difficult questions of first impression are presented.’” Reese, 643 F.3d at 688 (quoting

24

Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010)).

25
26
27
28

Here, there are novel and difficult questions of first impression relating to the trespass to
chattels claim. Although Kremen conclusively established that conversion applies to domain
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1

names, there remains substantial ground for disagreement as to whether the related tort of trespass

2

to chattels extends to other forms of intangible property. See, e.g., Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel

3

Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 239 n. 21 (2010) (noting that conversion traditionally required a

4

taking of tangible property and observing that “the expansion of conversion law to reach

5

intangible property should not be permitted to ‘displace other, more suitable law’”). Some courts

6

have applied trespass to chattels to other forms of intangible property, including websites. See,

7

e.g., YLD Ltd. v. Node Firm, 2016 WL 7851414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (applying New

8

York and federal law and denying motion to dismiss claims for trespass to chattels and conversion

9

that were based, in part, on an alleged disruption to the use of a website); Combs v. Doe, 2011 WL

10

738052, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2011) (magistrate’s report and recommendation granting default

11

judgment on conversion claim based on allegations that defendant stole website and domain

12

names by hacking into plaintiff’s email); Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d

13

609, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (sustaining claim for conversion of copyrighted website); Ground Zero

14

Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F. Supp. 2d 678, 698 (D. Md. 2011) (finding allegations that

15

defendant deprived plaintiff of possession of website and damaged the chattel by inserting a

16

redirect command support a legally cognizable trespass to chattels claim); State Analysis, Inc. v.

17

Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 (E.D. Va. 2009) (sustaining trespass to chattels

18

claim where defendant accessed a password protected portion of plaintiff’s website and thereby

19

diminished the value of plaintiff’s “possessory interest in its computer network”). Other courts

20

have not. See e.g., GNI Waterman LLC v. A/M Valve Co. LLC, 2007 WL 2669503, at *11 (E.D.

21

Cal. Sept. 7, 2007) (dismissing trespass to chattels claim that was based on intangible ownership

22

rights of forms, designs and patterns); Discovery Educ., Inc. v. SchoolsPLP, 2021 WL 2292223, at

23

* 3 (D. Del. June 4, 2021) (dismissing trespass to chattels claim because no Delaware court had

24

extended the tort to a website and plaintiff had not alleged damage to the website); Exeter Twp. v.

25

Gardecki, 2018 WL 6616930, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2018) (“electronic files” are not chattel);

26

Tethys Bioscience, Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 2010 WL 2287474,

27
28
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1

at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010) (citing Silvaco, refusing to extend Kremen to a patent application).

2

Further, Defendant’s preemption argument raises a novel and difficult issue. Although the

3

law is clear that websites fall within the subject matter of copyright1, no court has considered

4

whether copyright preemption applies to a claim for implied contract/unjust enrichment that is

5

based on allegations that defendant superimposed advertisements on a website homepage and other

6

landing pages without the consent of or compensation to the website owner.
Defendant’s First Amendment argument similarly raises a novel and difficult issue. Although

United States District Court
Northern District of California

7
8

courts have recognized that the First Amendment protects search engine output results2, no court has

9

considered whether that protection extends to advertisements and other messages superimposed on a

10

website homepage and other landing pages. The Court thus concludes that the second requirement for

11

§ 1292(b) is satisfied.

12

C.

13

Third, the “materially advance” prong is satisfied when the resolution of the question “may

Material Advance of the Ultimate Termination of the Litigation

14

appreciably shorten the time, effort, or expense of conducting” the district court proceedings. In

15

re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1027. Guidance from the Ninth Circuit on any of the questions raised by

16

Defendant will materially advance the litigation. If the Ninth Circuit rules in favor of Defendant

17

on even one question, then one or more of Plaintiffs’ claims will be dismissed. This would impact

18

the scope of Plaintiffs’ case and potentially their ability to pursue claims on behalf of a putative

19

class.

20

Plaintiffs contend that an interlocutory appeal will only delay the litigation because they

21

anticipate either a complete affirmance of the Order or a reversal without prejudice to Plaintiffs’

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

See Ticketmaster LLC v. Prestige Entm’t W., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1160-61 (C.D. Cal.
2018) (concluding that websites are copyrightable as original works of authorship); Integrative
Nutrition, Inc. v. Acad. of Healing Nutrition, 476 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“[c]opyright protection for a website may extend to both the screen displays and the computer
code for the website”).
1

2

See E-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2016)
(collecting cases); Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding
First Amendment protected search engine’s decision to promote and display third-party content).
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1

right to file an amended complaint. But even an affirmance may provide useful guidance before

2

the parties engage in potentially wide-ranging and expensive discovery into how millions of

3

websites may have been displayed on Android devices over a two-year period.

4

III.

CONCLUSION

5

Defendant’s motion for certification of interlocutory appeal of the Court’s Order is

6

GRANTED. That Order involves controlling questions of law, and “[s]o long as one controlling

7

question is identified, an order can be certified for appeal to resolve ‘all questions material to the

8

order.’” Steering Comm. v. United States, 6 F.3d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, pursuant

9

to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the Court CERTIFIES the Order for interlocutory appeal. This matter is

10

stayed pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit. Upon resolution of the stay, either party may ask

11

the Court to reopen the case and lift the stay.

12
13
14

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 2, 2022

15
16
17

EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
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